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Bring on the
physics revolution
JOHN B. DAVIES argues that it is time for a paradigm shift in psychology.
SOME years ago a student submitteda practical assignment in which hewrote something along these lines:
I collected the data on Sauchiehall
Street on Friday afternoon. I asked any
young-looking males (who didn’t look
too scary!) to fill in the questionnaire. 
It started to rain about four o’clock so 
I went in Costa Coffee, and when I came
out there weren’t so many people about,
so I finished it off on Saturday morning.
Colleagues felt this was inappropriate in 
a practical essay on a scientific subject. They
objected to the use of the word ‘I’, which
by definition made it a subjective account;
and they suggested that a phrase such as
‘Data were collected from a random
sample of young males’ would have been
more suitable. But I disagreed strongly,
arguing that the student account was more
informative, more scientific, more honest,
and there was no attempt to hide behind
scientific rhetoric. And obviously, the
sample could not be called random.
My reaction was sparked by the
realisation that for years I had trotted 
out the phrase ‘psychology is a science’
without really knowing what ‘science’
was, apart from something to do with 
being ‘objective’ and searching for ‘truth’,
without allowing any sort of personal bias,
opinion or motive to intrude on the process.
But isn’t this impossible? How could I be
‘objective’ when everything I do is a
consequence of my own preferences,
biases, previous experiences and emotional
states? And I don’t know how to do
anything without a personal motive; when
one of my studies works out the way I
hoped it would, I run through the corridors
punching the air and shouting, ‘Yes!’
I do not propose at this stage to
regurgitate the scientific philosophy of
Popper, or the empiricist doctrine of Ayer;
nor am I going to contrast these with the
Khunian idea of paradigm shift as a
motivated social process rather than the
inexorable march of an objective science
into a golden future. These arguments are
far from new, and should in my opinion
form a key part of all our undergraduate
courses. I regret that generally they do not.
However, for decades another mantra of
mine had been ‘psychology is a science
like physics’. But the idea that psychology
is a science ‘like physics’ turns out to be
deeply unhelpful, because of arguments
about what physics is all about. Modern
physics basically commences with Newton,
whose genius imposed rationality and
predictability on phenomena that had
appeared metaphysical or mystical at the
time. Newton’s physics is deterministic,
it explains the movements of bodies and
planets in ways that make prediction
possible, and has pragmatic usefulness 
that is fundamental in making the modern
world work at a macroscopic level. But
Newtonian deterministic physics is over
300 years old, and since that time there
have been three revolutions (four if you
count string theory) that have shown
serious flaws in the Newtonian argument,
if one takes it to be a ‘real’ account of how
the world works. Newton’s science then 
is valuable not because it reveals truth; 
but rather because it solves problems of 
a certain type. And according to
contemporary philosophies of science,
that’s what it (science) always does. 
It seems to me that we have become so
obsessed with the Newtonian deterministic
version of physics that we forget a
fundamental fact. We adopt the Newtonian
model of how concrete objects behave, by
analogy, to the study of human behaviour.
This manifests itself in a number of ways,
including the prioritisation of mechanism
(the ‘cogs and wheels’ underlying action)
over purpose and intention, and the
assumed measurement of psychological
entities whose existence is dubious.
However, Newton says nothing about
people, except in so far as they have mass
and move around. On the other hand, 20th-
century theoretical physics offers
alternative brands of physical science,
in the shape of Einstein, Heisenberg, and
Feigenbaum, that offer new analogies. The
remainder of this article suggests that it is
now time to adopt a different physics for
the explanation of human action.
New paradigms
There are books about relativity, quantum
mechanics and chaos theory that are
accessible to the lay reader and that outline
the basic conclusions about the nature of
the universe that these approaches lead to. 
I find them absolutely compelling, and
have tried to consider where, by analogy,
they have implications for the work we do
as psychologists. My conclusions are (a)
that their implications are fundamental and
(b) that if we wish to be scientists after the
model of the physical sciences, it would be
nice if we adopted a model consistent with
contemporary physics, rather than a model
developed three centuries ago, which is
useful for some purposes, but which is 
now clearly not the best analogy for
solving problems with people.
A conclusion from Einstein is that
measurement is relative. Using Einstein’s
own homespun example of playing table
tennis on a moving train, the answer to the
question ‘How fast was the ball travelling
after you hit it?’ has a multitude of answers
between which one cannot choose until the
question ‘Relative to what?’ is answered.
By analogy, abundant empirical evidence
PERSONAL SPACE
‘For years I had trotted out
the phrase “psychology is a
science” without really
knowing what “science” was’
exists to show that the same is true for
psychological measurement. It is not
necessary to cite volumes on this point;
merely to note than when we wish to assess
the test–retest reliability of one of our tests
we insist on re-administration in exactly
the same form; the same people, the same
setting, the identical instructions. This
amounts to an admission on our part that
changing the setting is likely to change the
results. So obtaining high reliabilities is not
a measure of the intrinsic reliability of the
test itself, but rather a measure of the extent
to which we are able to produce identical
conditions. 
Heisenberg surely offers the most
fascinating analogy from a psychological
point of view. Firstly, Heisenberg recasts
the fundamental nature of the universe as
probabilistic rather than as deterministic;
a fundamental shift from Newton. But
Heisenberg then demonstrates, at a
subatomic level, something we all know
but usually prefer to pretend is of no
importance: that the act of observation
changes the phenomena being observed.
Heisenberg also shows that the results you
obtain are a function of the methods you
use to obtain them. Several experiments 
are widely cited, stemming from the
famous studies by Bohr, in which single
photons were fired through two slits, and
onto a screen. In a number of variations on
this theme, the very stuff of the universe
‘knows’ when it is being observed, ‘knows’
when other particles are being observed,
and ‘knows’ when it is about to be
observed even before the physicist knows.
The idea that as soon as you observe
something you change it seems to me to be
the most exciting and challenging starting
point for a modern psychological science
that it is possible to imagine. It opens the
door to the need for some serious
methodological development, and sheds
fundamental doubt on decades of past work
(including my own of course). How
marvellous! How long overdue!
By comparison, the analogy with chaos
theory is perhaps a little more mundane.
Chaos theory starts with the observation
that many cause–effect relationships do 
not fit a dose–response model. In such
circumstances mathematical models
produce oscillating and frequently contrary
solutions that cycle around alternative foci
or ‘strange attractors’. In a universe
characterised by non-linear relationships,
and populated with strange attractors and
sensitivities to initial conditions that
demand infinite levels of precision in
measurement (which are, of course, non-
achievable), Feigenbaum and his like-
minded fellows suggest that the actual act
of measurement becomes self-defeating.
The finer the level of detail in which you
measure something, the more it looks the
same; and where non-linear systems are
concerned, this happens without any
improvement in prediction. The saying
‘Shit happens’ appears to summarise the
Feigenbaum position fairly succinctly.
Feigenbaum certainly makes me think
twice every time I read a paper on complex
(non-linear?) social problems (most of
which have been under investigation for
decades, if not centuries) that concludes
with the phrase ‘It is clear that more
research is necessary’. I have to say it is
frequently not clear to me! And the
assumption behind the assertion, namely
that more research will one day tidy things
up once and for all, frequently fails to
convince me these days. 
Instead, it seems to me that the raw
materials for solutions to some of the major
problems that confront us are already out
there if we are prepared to grasp them, in
the shape of existing knowledge about race,
gender, education, social class, politics and
history. These are all areas where
psychologists have a fundamental part to
play; as part of social movements, politics,
histories and cultural change. Yet
historically we have viewed the
psychologist as achieving the ‘gold
standard’ when he or she conducts studies
in a way that is deliberately unconnected
with the way the real world works and
divorced from the reasons why people
behave as they do; as if the things that
make the world go round, motives, beliefs,
intentions, imaginings, are correctly viewed
as error when they are very well-springs of
behaviour. And that, I believe, is the result
of using Newton as our analogy for so
long; a science that explains quite
brilliantly the behaviour of planets, apples
and other things devoid of any motive,
purpose or intention, but which
unfortunately stops right there.
Time to grasp these nettles
If these new (relatively speaking)
paradigms suggest new ways of going
about our subject, then our routine
assertion that more ‘scientific research’ is
necessary starts to sound a little thin if by
‘more research’ we simply mean more
experiments, more randomised controlled
trials, more studies from which the
influence of the outside world has been
expunged, carried out by dispassionate
scientists searching for ‘truth.’ Clearly,
there is an important place for experimental
studies and RCT designs, but they are
merely one option when it comes to
accumulating data and, perhaps but not
necessarily, gaining some useful knowledge
that might even accumulate. However, the
‘gold standard’ they are certainly not.
Whilst experiments may be brilliantly
contrived in terms of design, control
groups, experimental setting and cool
instrumentation, the ghosts of Einstein,
Heisenberg and Feigenbaum stand
groaning in the background, insisting
respectively that our measurements are
context specific and do not generalise, that
what we see is not what we get, and finally
that if we keep looking at phenomena in
more and more detail, we’ll get finer and
finer grained data but be none the wiser!
Let me conclude by saying that the
views expressed here are no longer
particularly radical, although the argument
here is based on paradigms of science,
rather than on sociological or socio-
linguistic arguments. Nonetheless, I see
few signs of a willingness to grasp these
nettles, and plenty of evidence of a
reluctance even to subject the dominant
paradigms to serious scrutiny. At the end 
of the day, carrying out (allegedly) context-
free experiments and scrupulously missing
out the word ‘I’ in our reports are not the
defining features of science. It’s time for
something more fundamental. Bring on the
physics revolution.
■ Professor John Davies is in the Centre
for Applied Social Psychology, University
of Strathclyde, Glasgow.
December 2004
693
The Psychologist Vol 17 No 12
Personal space
‘More research is necessary’ is sometimes
an excuse to put one’s head in the sand
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